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We introduce the concept of a superlinear threshold detector, a detector that has a higher prob-
ability to detect multiple photons if it receives them simultaneously rather than at separate times.
Highly superlinear threshold detectors in quantum key distribution systems allow eavesdropping
the full secret key without being revealed. Here, we generalize the detector control attack, and
analyze how it performs against quantum key distribution systems with moderately superlinear de-
tectors. We quantify the superlinearity in superconducting single-photon detectors based on earlier
published data, and gated avalanche photodiode detectors based on our own measurements. The
analysis shows that quantum key distribution systems using detector(s) of either type can be vul-
nerable to eavesdropping. The avalanche photodiode detector becomes superlinear towards the end
of the gate. For systems expecting substantial loss, or for systems not monitoring loss, this would
allow eavesdropping using trigger pulses containing less than 120 photons per pulse. Such an attack
would be virtually impossible to catch with an optical power meter at the receiver entrance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Single photon detectors [1] can be regarded as essen-
tial parts of quantum information processing hardware,
and are certainly crucial components in quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) systems [2–7]. In QKD, the commu-
nicating parties Alice and Bob exploit the properties of
quantum mechanics to reveal any eavesdropping attempt
by the eavesdropper Eve. The security of QKD has been
proven for perfect devices [4, 5]. However, when the secu-
rity of QKD is to be proven for practical systems [8–16],
it is necessary to construct models based on assumptions
about the practical devices, and hence also about the
single photon detectors.
With a few exceptions [17, 18], most single photon de-
tectors suitable for QKD systems are threshold detectors
that cannot resolve the number of photons in a pulse.
They rather have a binary response distinguishing be-
tween zero, and ‘one or more’ photons, where a detection
event is often referred to as a “click”. Threshold detec-
tors are usually characterized by their quantum efficiency
η, which is the probability to detect a single photon.
For multiphoton pulses, a very common assumption is
that each photon within the pulse is detected individu-
ally with probability η. Then, the detection probability
of a n-photon Fock state can be expressed as
pdet(n) = 1− (1− η)
n. (1)
We refer to threshold detectors with a multiphoton detec-
tion probability higher than the one given by Eq. (1) as
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superlinear threshold detectors. A superlinear threshold
detector has a larger probability to detect multiple pho-
tons if it receives them nearly simultaneously, than if it
receives each of the photons separately at different times.
This effect is well known in multiphoton absorption by
atoms [19], where the multiphoton absorption rate can
be much higher for chaotic light than for laser light with
the same mean intensity. Meanwhile for threshold detec-
tors, superlinear response may also originate from how
the entire device converts individual excitations into the
macroscopic detection event.
The photon number of a coherent state follows a Pois-
son distribution with probability pn = µ
ne−µ/n!, where
µ is the mean photon number. Therefore, if the detection
probability of a n-photon Fock state is given by Eq. (1),
a coherent state with mean photon number µ is detected
with probability
pdet =
∞∑
n=0
µne−µ
n!
pdet(n) = 1− e
−µη. (2)
Note that for a coherent state with mean photon number
µ, a superlinear threshold detector with quantum effi-
ciency η will have a higher detection probability than
the one given by Eq. (2).
Insufficient models of single photon detectors have
caused numerous security loopholes [15, 20–30] in QKD.
For instance, the time-shift attack [21] based on detector
efficiency mismatch [20] has been shown to break the se-
curity of a commercial QKD system [24]. More recently,
the detector control attack [25–30] allows the eavesdrop-
per to capture the full key without revealing her presence
(via errors in the key). Specifically, the attack intro-
duces zero quantum bit error rate (QBER). Furthermore,
2this attack which is based on bright illumination is im-
plementable with current technology. Two commercial
QKD systems were shown to be vulnerable to the attack
[25–27], and a full eavesdropper has been implemented
to capture the full key of an experimental QKD system
under realistic conditions [29]. However, the power level
(more than 500µW) of the eavesdropper’s illumination
has led to discussions whether an optical power meter at
the entrance of Bob can be used to detect these attacks
[31–34].
In this paper we propose and analyze an attack against
QKD systems with superlinear detectors (Sec. II). Note
that the previously published detector control attack [25]
is based on an extreme superlinear behavior of the detec-
tors, and can therefore be considered a special case of
the “imperfect” detector control attack presented here.
Then we discuss how the attack would perform against
superconducting single photon detectors [35, 36], which
have been reported to exhibit superlinear behavior (Sec-
tion III). In Sec. IV we show that APD-based gated
detectors have a substantial superlinear response at the
end of the gate. The superlinear behavior at the end
of the gate allows eavesdropping with very faint trigger
pulses [25, 32]. This faint after-gate attack will be virtu-
ally impossible to catch with an optical power meter at
the entrance of Bob. At least one security proof covers
QKD systems with superlinear detectors [16]. In Sec. V
we show how the detector control attack relates to the
security proof, and discuss possible countermeasures. Fi-
nally, we conclude in Sec. VI.
II. THEORY OF SUPERLINEAR DETECTOR
CONTROL
The core of the previously proposed detector control
attacks is the following [25]: in the Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) [2] family of protocols, Eve uses a random
basis to measure the quantum state from Alice. Then
she resends her measurement result, not as a single pho-
ton, but rather as a bright pulse, called a trigger pulse,
with a carefully selected optical power. Then, if Eve uses
Bob’s measurement basis, her trigger pulse is always de-
tected by Bob. On the contrary, if Eve uses a basis not
matching Bob’s to measure the quantum state from Alice,
her trigger pulse is never detected. This is possible be-
cause Bob’s detectors are very superlinear: for less than
a factor of two (3 dB) increase in trigger pulse power, the
detection probability shoots from 0 to 100%. Since Eve
uses the correct basis only half of the time, the total loss
between Alice and Bob is 3 dB. For the differential-phase-
shift protocol [37, 38] there is no basis choice, so the same
factor of two (3 dB) superlinearity allows eavesdropping
without extra loss [30]. The coherent one-way protocol
[39, 40] is also vulnerable to the detector control attacks
[30], but requires a more strict relationship between the
superlinearities of the detectors in the system.
The previously proposed detector control attacks allow
Eve to capture the full secret key without introducing any
QBER. However, Alice and Bob usually tolerate a non-
zero QBER (typically less than 11%). Therefore, Eve
might introduce a small QBER without getting caught.
What if the superlinearity of the detector is such that
when Eve selects the right basis, the trigger pulse is de-
tected with a high probability, while when Eve selects the
wrong basis, the trigger pulse is detected with a low prob-
ability? One can immediately identify two consequences
of this “imperfect” detector control attack: the non-unity
detection probability when Eve uses the right basis will
contribute extra to the loss. On the other hand, the non-
zero detection probability when Eve uses the wrong basis
will introduce a non-zero QBER.
We will here consider an active basis choice BB84 im-
plementation using two detectors. In a passive basis
choice BB84 implementation [41], Eve’s trigger pulse will
strike the detectors in both bases simultaneously for each
bit. For this case, the QBER introduced by the attack
depends on how Bob handles simultaneous clicks in both
bases. Assume that Bob assigns a random bit value to
these events. Then, if the probability for simultaneous
clicks in both bases is non-zero, the QBER introduced
by a “imperfect” detector control attack will be higher
in a passive basis choice implementation than in an ac-
tive basis choice implementation. In any case, for passive
basis choice implementations, the theoretical QBER de-
rived below can be used as a lower bound.
To calculate the QBER caused by this attack, let pf,i
be the detection probability in detector i for the trigger
pulse with full power. Likewise, let ph,i be the detection
probability at detector i with half the power. We assume
Eve resends the same power regardless of her detected
bit value, that double clicks are assigned to a random
bit value [42], and that Eve selects Bob’s measurement
basis with probability 1/2. When Eve resends in the
wrong basis and Bob has a detection, the bit value will
be erroneous with probability 1/2. Therefore, the QBER
caused by the “imperfect” detector control attack is given
by
QBER =
1
2
Bob detects and Eve used wrong basis
Bob has a detection
=
ph,0 + ph,1 − ph,0ph,1
pf,0 + pf,1 + 2(ph,0 + ph,1 − ph,0ph,1)
,
(3)
where dark counts have been omitted. Errors originating
from dark counts would add to the errors caused by the
attack. However, in a good detector design the amount
of errors from dark counts is minimized. Since we require
the eavesdropper to reproduce the detection probability
from normal operating conditions, the dark count prob-
ability would be minimized under attack as well. A high
dark count probability, and thus a high error rate with-
out the eavesdropper would leave the attack less room
for errors to be introduced. However, an equivalent re-
striction on the attack is easier obtained by lowering the
acceptance threshold for the QBER. Therefore, our anal-
yses is limited to the QBER introduced by the attack,
3and dark counts are omitted. Assuming that both de-
tectors have equal detection probabilities, pf,i = pf and
ph,i = ph, Eq. (3) simplifies to
QBER =
2ph − p
2
h
2pf + 2(2ph − p2h)
. (4)
As discussed above, the perfect detector control attack
introduces 3 dB loss when applied against BB84 QKD
systems with active basis choice in Bob’s implementation,
because Eve only selects the correct basis half of the time.
If mini pf,i < 1, the attack will cause an even higher loss.
On the other hand, maxi ph,i > 0 will reduce the loss
introduced by the attack. Therefore, the transmittance
T when an “imperfect” detector control attack is applied
against a BB84 QKD system with active basis choice is
given by
T =
1
4
(pf,0 + pf,1) +
1
2
(ph,0 + ph,1 − ph,0ph,1) . (5)
Note that T refers to the transmittance between Eve and
Bob. If Eve uses imperfect detectors, this will add to the
total loss observed by Alice and Bob. For the remainder
of the paper, we simply consider Eve to use perfect de-
tectors. Since Eve can place her detectors close to Alice,
and she can use detectors with almost unity detection
efficiency [18], this is an acceptable assumption. If both
detectors have equal probabilities, Eq. (5) simplifies to
T =
1
2
pf +
1
2
(
2ph − p
2
h
)
. (6)
Note that in passive implementations of Bob, such as pas-
sive basis choice in BB84 [41], or in distributed phase ref-
erence protocols [37–40], there is no 3 dB loss due to basis
choice. Therefore, the above expression for the transmit-
tance T can be considered a lower bound also for such
implementations.
In most cases, the eavesdropper can introduce sub-
stantial loss without getting noticed. With the notable
exception of transition-edge sensors [18], the quantum
efficiency of Bob’s detectors is typically about 10% at
telecom wavelengths [1]. Furthermore, an optical fiber
usually exhibits a loss of about 0.2 dB/km at 1550 nm
wavelength. Adding the loss owing to detector’s quan-
tum efficiency to the loss in the line at a typical distance
of 50 km, Alice and Bob normally observe a total loss of
20 dB, corresponding to T ∼ 0.01. In addition to this,
there is loss in the optical path inside Bob’s apparatus.
However, Eve can always adjust the power in her trig-
ger pulses to strike Bob’s detectors with a given optical
power. Therefore, by inserting her eavesdropping station
into the line close to Alice’s system, Eve has almost the
full 20 dB at her disposal. In one case, a QKD system op-
erating with loss up to 40 dB has been reported [43] (but
the actual, tolerable loss might be less because there is
no satisfactory security proof for the protocol used in
Ref. [43]). Therefore, it seems that for many QKD se-
tups, Eve can introduce loss of more than 20 dB without
being revealed from the reduction in the transmittance.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) The detection probability versus mean
photon number in the trigger pulse for the SSPD in Ref. [36],
at 1550 nm and Ib = 0.8Ic. Count rates were extracted from
Fig. 1 in Ref. [36], and divided by the pulse repetition fre-
quency of 82MHz to obtain the detection probability. The
red circled data points were used to calculate the QBER and
the transmittance from an attack.
III. SUPERLINEARITY OF
SUPERCONDUCTING SINGLE PHOTON
DETECTORS
Superconducting single photon detectors (SSPDs)
based on superconducting nanowires [35] have been used
for long-distance QKD experiments [43–47], due to their
ultra low dark count rate and timing jitter. However, the
need for cryogenic cooling to temperatures in the 2–4K
range has prevented them from being used in commercial
QKD systems.
In SSPDs, the nanowire is cooled to the superconduct-
ing state. Then, then the nanowire is biased with a cur-
rent Ib slightly lower than the critical current Ic. Be-
cause the wire is superconducing at Ib, there is no voltage
drop over the device. A photon incident on the nanowire
can create a normally-conducting hotspot, with the ef-
fect that the whole cross-section of the nanowire becomes
normally conducting. This increases the voltage over the
device. Afterwards, the cooling restores superconductiv-
ity in the nanowire, and the current increases back to the
bias current. This dead time is usually about 10 ns. The
biasing current Ib can be adjusted for a trade-off between
high detection efficiency and low dark count rate.
Already in the first systematic investigation of the
detection efficiency of SSPDs [36], superlinear behavior
due to multiphoton absorption mechanisms was reported.
The superlinear behavior is wavelength dependent, and
is substantial at 1550 nm, which is the wavelength suit-
able for long-distance experiments. Figure 1 shows the
detection count data for 1550 nm extracted from Fig. 1
in Ref. [36], processed as detection probability (count
rate/trigger pulse rate), and plotted on a linear scale.
The SSPD was biased at Ib/Ic = 0.8. The superlinear
4behavior is suitable for eavesdropping in QKD: by in-
creasing the photon number, the detection probability
increases sharply. Using trigger pulses containing 106
photons per pulse, Eq. (4) predicts a QBER of less than
3%, and Eq. (6) predicts a transmittance T > 0.20 (as-
suming reasonable errors in extracting the numerical data
from the plot in Ref. [36]). Therefore, a QKD system us-
ing this SSPD would clearly be vulnerable to a detector
control attack.
Judging by the low detection probability at one pho-
ton per pulse for this SSPD, the QKD experiments would
use a higher bias current to get better sensitivity. Unfor-
tunately, few publications seems to report the detection
probabilities for pulses above the single photon level, es-
pecially for 1550 nm wavelength. The available literature
shows that SSPDs are less superlinear at shorter wave-
lengths [36], and also less superlinear at higher bias cur-
rents [48]. However, note that any superlinear detector
response must be handled in the security proof. There-
fore, the reported data on SSPDs [36, 48] clearly shows
that such a security proof is necessary for QKD systems
using SSPDs.
IV. SUPERLINEARITY OF GATED
APD-BASED DETECTORS
The gated APD-based detectors in the QKD system
Clavis2 by ID Quantique exhibit substantial superlinear
behavior far after the gate [27], or when blinded by bright
illumination [25, 26]. However, as pointed out before
[25, 31], the bright trigger pulses might be revealed by
an optical power meter at the entrance of Bob. Here, we
show that at the end of the gate, when the APD is biased
close to the breakdown voltage, the superlinear response
allows Eve to use very faint trigger pulses.
The detection probability during the gate was mea-
sured as follows: The gated InGaAs detectors in the
QKD system Clavis2 were run with factory settings, but
with the gating frequency reduced from 5MHz to 98 kHz.
The reduced frequency corresponds to the factory fre-
quency with a detection in every gate, and afterpulse
blocking (forced 10µs deadtime after detection events
to reduce dark counts) enabled. A short-pulsed laser
(see Appendix A for the pulse shape) was attenuated
to the appropriate mean photon number, and connected
directly to the fiber pigtail of each detector. Then, the
laser pulse was scanned through the gate in steps of 25 ps,
and the detection probability was recorded in each step.
The “quantum efficiency” η was measured by applying
a coherent state µ = 1, and solving η from Eq. (2). In
fact, the detector is slightly superlinear, but a coherent
state with µ = 1 [49] contains only a small fraction of
multiphoton pulses.
Once the quantum efficiency η is known, Eq. (2) can be
used to calculate the expected detection probability for a
coherent state with any mean photon number, assuming
that each photon is detected individually. Figure 2 shows
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FIG. 2. (Color online) The measured detection probability
for a coherent state with µ = 20, 40, 60 and 80, compared
to the expected detection probabilities predicted by Eq. (2).
Data points are 25 ps apart. Data for detector 0 is shown; de-
tector 1 behaved very similarly. When the mean photon num-
ber µ is increased, deviation between the expected detection
probabilities and the actual measured detection probabilities
increases, especially at the end of the gate. See also Fig. 3.
the detection probability of a coherent state for various
mean photon numbers predicted by Eq. (2), compared to
the actual detection probabilities measured in our exper-
iment.
The measurement data matches the expected detec-
tor response fairly well until the falling edge of the gate.
There, the measured detection probability becomes su-
perlinear. One possible explanation for this could be the
following: an avalanche, started by a photon in a local-
ized spot, laterally spreads over time to encompass the
entire junction area of the APD [50]. For detection events
before the falling edge of the gate, the avalanche has suf-
ficient time to spread and therefore the current reaches
the same amplitude regardless of the number of pho-
tons absorbed in the APD [17]. At the end of the gate,
an avalanche from a single photon absorption does not
have sufficient time to spread to the entire junction area,
and therefore only causes a small current insufficient of
crossing the comparator threshold. However, multiple
photon absorptions in different spots across the junction
can start multiple small avalanches that together provide
enough current to cross the comparator threshold. This is
exactly the process exploited to make photon number re-
solving APD-based detectors [17]. Avalanche spreading
assisted by secondary photons re-emitted by the APD,
has already been used to explain avalanche development
[50, 51]. Similarly, multiple photon absorptions caused
by the multiphoton pulse could speed up the avalanche
development.
For the gated APD-based detectors, the superlinear
response can be exploited in a faint version of the after-
gate attack [27]. From Eve’s perspective, the original
after-gate attack has some drawbacks. The attack may
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Detection probability at the falling
edge of the gate (at the 4 ns point in Fig. 2). For µ < 40, the
shape of the actual detection probability is clearly superlinear,
in contrast to the nearly linear expected detection probability.
cause a substantial amount of errors in the key, because
the bright pulses cause afterpulses with a random bit
value. Furthermore, in principle, an optical power meter
can be used to catch Eve’s bright pulses. Also, remov-
ing gates randomly or as a part of afterpulse blocking
(to avoid excessive dark counts) would reveal the attack
because the trigger pulses would cause clicks regardless
of the presence of a gate. Then, detection events with-
out a gate applied would indicate the presence of the
eavesdropper. Similarly, it has been noted that in the
original after-gate attack could be countered by ignoring
detection events outside the gate [33], while for this faint
after-gate attack, the detections happen within the gate
[34].
As discussed in Sec. II, having a “high” detection prob-
ability for a given trigger pulse power, and a “low” detec-
tion probability for a 3 dB dimmer trigger pulse is suit-
able for Eve’s attack. Figure 3 shows the measured and
expected detection probability at a single point at the
falling edge of the gate. For less than 40 photons per
trigger pulse, the APDs clearly exhibit superlinear re-
sponse in favor of the eavesdropper.
The detection probability curve of the detector 0 (the
results are very similar for detector 1) was used when cal-
culating QBER and transmittance from Eqs. (4) and (6).
Figure 4 shows the resulting QBER and the correspond-
ing transmittance for various mean photon numbers in
the trigger pulse, when the trigger pulse timing was opti-
mized to minimize the QBER. The data indicates that a
faint after-gate attack could cause a QBER around 13%
with a transmittance of about 0.005, corresponding to
23 dB loss (for instance, for µ = 40, pf = 0.0054 and
ph = 0.00089 at the point 4.525 ns in Fig. 2). As dis-
cussed in Sec. II, this transmittance corresponds to Bob’s
detectors having 10% quantum efficiency, a line loss cor-
responding to about 50 km of fiber and another 3 dB loss
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FIG. 4. (Color online) The minimum QBER (solid curve)
caused by trigger pulses with various mean photon number
calculated from Eq. (4) and the corresponding transmittance
(dashed curve) calculated from Eq. (6). The data contains
some noise due to fluctuations in applied power and/or fluc-
tuations in the detection efficiency.
in Bob’s apparatus, which are reasonable values.
While most QKD systems do not accept QBER above
11% [5], there are post-processing protocols which ac-
cept QBER up to 20% [52]. Also note that the QBER
introduced by the attack may be significantly lower with
yet shorter trigger pulses, since they would better resolve
the superlinear behavior at the falling edge of the gate.
A relatively wide pulse we’re using (Appendix A) arrives
at both linear and superlinear regions of the gate. There-
fore the superlinear response to it must be less than that
to a narrower pulse arriving only at the most superlinear
point in the gate.
The detectors in Clavis2 have been shown to exhibit
detection efficiency mismatch [20, 24, 53]. Therefore, in
the general case one would have to use different timings
and/or different powers depending on the bit value, to
avoid skewing the bit value distribution in the raw key.
Also, the superlinearity could be exploited in other at-
tacks, such as the faked-state attack [53, 54] and con-
ventional quantum attacks, to make them more efficient
[15].
ID Quantique has been notified about this loophole
prior to the submission of the manuscript.
V. COUNTERMEASURES AND PROOF OF
SECURITY
The security of QKD systems with arbitrary non-
linearities in Bob’s system, and therefore superlinear
threshold detectors has already been proved [16]. With-
out source imperfections and with symmetry in the two
bases, the secret key rate is given by [16]
R ≥ −h(QBER) + η(1− h(QBER)), (7)
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Comparison of the detector control at-
tack and the bound from the security proof [16]. The region
to the left of the security bound curve (solid curve) allows
extraction a secure key. The region to the right of the de-
tector control attack curve (dashed curve) is clearly insecure,
because the attack presented in Sec. II can be applied. The
region between the curves should be assumed insecure.
where h( · ) is the binary entropy function, and η is the
smallest detection probability of a non-vacuum state. If
one further assumes that the probability to detect a mul-
tiphoton state is higher than a single photon, η is simply
the quantum efficiency (the probability to detect a single
photon).
As for the detector control attack, let us assume the
worst-case superlinearity, namely that a single photon is
detected with probability η, while a two-photon state is
detected with probability 1. Then, Eve can use trigger
pulses with two photons, and Eq. (4) simplifies to
QBER =
2η − η2
2 + 2(2η − η2)
. (8)
Figure 5 shows Eq. (7) for R = 0 and Eq. (8), com-
paring the “imperfect” detector control attack with the
bounds derived in the security proof [16]. It shows that a
sufficiently high detection probability, and thus quantum
efficiency allows extraction of secret key regardless of any
superlinear detector response. For instance, if the QBER
is 5%, a quantum efficiency η > 0.4 allows the extraction
of secret key. Note that a high quantum efficiency does
not remove the superlinear effect, but then the security
proof makes it possible to remove any knowledge Eve
could have obtained exploiting the superlinear response,
by (a large amount of) extra privacy amplification [55].
For gated systems, one possible countermeasure might
be bit-mapped gating [56]. Then, the basis selector is
used to randomize all detection events outside the center
of the gate. Therefore, trigger pulses timed at the falling
edge of the gate would cause random detections and thus
a QBER of 50%. This would reveal Eve’s presence. How-
ever, the security analysis for bit-mapped gating requires
that each photon is detected individually during the tran-
sition of the basis selector. In practice, this means that
the detectors must have a detection probability given by
Eq. (2) in the center of the gate. Figure 2 shows that
this is nearly the case. It might be possible to detect
each photon completely individually in the middle of the
gate by expanding the gate, or by shaping the applied
electrical gate appropriately.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we have analyzed the security of QKD
systems using superlinear threshold detectors. The de-
tector control attack previously reported [25] is based on
very superlinear detection probability: when the ampli-
tude of the trigger pulses is increased, the detection prob-
ability sharply increases from 0 to 100%. This allows
eavesdropping the full key without causing any errors,
the only side effect is 3 dB total loss. Here, the detector
control attack is generalized to moderately superlinear
detectors by accepting a limited amount of errors in the
key, and/or accepting a higher loss. Note that in practice,
a total loss of about 20 dB may be tolerable, as discussed
in Sec. II.
Nanowire SSPDs [35] have been reported to have su-
perlinear detection probability [36]. We have shown
that by carefully selecting the trigger pulse amplitude,
an eavesdropper would introduce a QBER of less than
3% when attacking the SSPD in Ref. [36]. The total
loss caused by the eavesdropping would be less than
6 dB. Therefore, a QKD system using this detector would
clearly be insecure.
Figures 2 and 3 show that the response of the APD-
based gated detector is superlinear at the falling edge of
the gate. Therefore, it is possible to attack the gated
detectors with faint trigger pulses, with less than 120
photons per pulse. From the measurements, the attack
would cause a QBER of about 13% and about 23 dB loss.
Most QKD systems do not accept a QBER above 11%
[5], but there are post-processing protocols allowing a
QBER up to 20% [52]. Furthermore, we suspect that
both the QBER and the loss could be reduced by using
shorter trigger pulses [57]. Finally, even if the attack is
not directly applicable to some QKD systems due to the
QBER and/or loss threshold, the superlinear response
of the APD-based detector shows that ordinary security
proofs no longer apply to these systems. Therefore, these
systems must use advanced security proofs to bound and
remove Eve’s partial knowledge from the moderate su-
perlinear response.
The faint after-gate attack does not suffer from the lim-
itations of the original after-gate attack [27]. In the faint
after-gate attack, the afterpulsing is negligible. Further-
more, with less than 120 photons per pulse, the trigger
pulses should be nearly impossible to catch with an opti-
cal power meter at the entrance of Bob. Also, removing
gates randomly or due to after-pulse blocking will not
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Pulse shape of the id300 short-pulsed
laser, measured with a 45GHz optical probe on a 12.5GHz
sampling oscilloscope at a pulse repetition rate of 100 kHz.
expose the attack [27] since such trigger pulse will not
cause a click unless there is a gate present. Furthermore,
the timing of the trigger pulse detection will be very sim-
ilar to a normal detection inside the gate, and therefore
difficult to discard based on timing [33].
If the detectors have an increasing detection proba-
bility for increasing photon number, a sufficiently high
quantum efficiency makes it possible to remove Eve’s
knowledge using privacy amplification [55]. For gated
APD-based detectors, bit-mapped gating [56] can be used
if each photon is detected individually in the center of the
gate.
Quantum key distribution has been proven secure for
all future, so currently the challenge is to make a secure
implementation. We believe that weeding out loopholes
caused by the implementation is a necessary step towards
achieving practical secure QKD, and that this work is
crucial because it fully exposes the nature of the detector
control attack.
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Appendix A: Pulse shape of id300
Figure 6 shows the pulse shape of the id300 short-
pulsed laser [58]. This is the particular laser sample used
in this experiment; other samples of this laser model may
have a different pulse shape.
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